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Lessons from History 
for Counter-
Terrorism Strategic 
Communications 
 
Drawing on the Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communication (CTSC) 
Project’s research paper A Brief History of Propaganda during Conflict, this 
Policy Brief lays out the key policy-relevant lessons for developing effective 
counter-terrorism strategic communications. It presents a framework of 
interrelated macro-, mezzo- and micro-level considerations for maximizing 
the efficacy of not just a strategic communications campaign but message 
design. Historical examples are drawn upon to illustrate their practical 
application. The Policy Brief concludes by analysing four key strategic-policy 
principles arguing that a counter-terrorism strategic communications 
campaign is more likely to be successful if it is based on the cumulative 
effects of a multidimensional messaging strategy. 
 
 
DOI: 10.19165/2016.2.04 
ISSN: 2468-0486
ICCT Policy Brief 
June 2016 
 
Authors:  
Haroro J. Ingram 
Alastair Reed 
About the Authors 
 
Haroro J. Ingram 
 
Dr. Haroro J. Ingram is an ICCT Associate Fellow from the Australian National 
University (Canberra). Ingram’s Australian Research Council funded research analyses 
the role of propaganda in the strategies of violent non-state political movements with 
the Afghan Taliban and Da’esh as major case studies. His research draws heavily on 
primary source materials, most of which is collected during periods of fieldwork in 
South Asia and the Middle East where he has interviewed current and former activists 
and fighters as well as civilians. This field research has included interviews with current 
and former counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operatives. Ingram is also a 
visiting fellow with the Naval Postgraduate School's Defense Analysis Department 
(Monterey, California). To contact the author, please send an e-mail to 
haroro.ingram@anu.edu.au. 
 
Alastair Reed 
 
Dr. Alastair Reed is Acting Director of ICCT. Prior to this he was Research Coordinator 
and a Research Fellow at ICCT, joining ICCT and Leiden University’s Institute of Security 
and Global Affairs in the autumn of 2014. Previously, he was an Assistant Professor at 
Utrecht University, where he completed his doctorate on research focused on 
understanding the processes of escalation and de-escalation in Ethnic Separatist 
conflicts in India and the Philippines. His main areas of interest are Terrorism and 
Insurgency, Conflict Analysis, Conflict Resolution, Military and Political Strategy, and 
International Relations, in particular with a regional focus on South Asia and South-East 
Asia. His current research projects address the foreign-fighter phenomenon, focusing 
on motivation and the use of strategic communications. 
 
 
About ICCT 
 
The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) is an independent think and do tank 
providing multidisciplinary policy advice and practical, solution-oriented implementation support on 
prevention and the rule of law, two vital pillars of effective counter-terrorism. ICCT’s work focuses on themes 
at the intersection of countering violent extremism and criminal justice sector responses, as well as human 
rights related aspects of counter-terrorism. The major project areas concern countering violent extremism, 
rule of law, foreign fighters, country and regional analysis, rehabilitation, civil society engagement and victims’ 
voices. Functioning as a nucleus within the international counter-terrorism network, ICCT connects experts, 
policymakers, civil society actors and practitioners from different fields by providing a platform for productive 
collaboration, practical analysis, and exchange of experiences and expertise, with the ultimate aim of 
identifying innovative and comprehensive approaches to preventing and countering terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Introduction 
 
There has been a tendency in the counter-terrorism academic and strategic-policy 
fields to impulsively assume that the challenges presented by 21st century extremist 
propaganda are unique and that history provides little more than an interesting 
footnote to the present. Such a perspective, in being both conceptually and 
thematically short-sighted, risks ignoring important lessons that can be drawn from a 
broader historical perspective. The Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications 
(CTSC) Project’s A Brief History of Propaganda during Conflict 1  placed the current 
challenge of understanding and confronting extremist propaganda into an historical 
context and identified a number of pertinent policy-relevant lessons for developing 
effective counter-terrorism strategic communications campaigns. 
 
Macro-, Mezzo- & Micro-Level Lessons 
 
Persuasive communication has been partnered with war for millennia. The historical 
evolution of propaganda during war has been driven by three persistent factors: (i.) 
advancements in communication technologies, (ii.) developments in military strategy 
and technology, and (iii.) the changing relationship between political elites and the 
people. Recurring trends emerge from this history that are largely products of the 
interplay of these three persistent factors. Despite changes in socio-political dynamics 
and extraordinary advancements in communication and military technologies, some 
fundamental challenges have cyclically emerged throughout this history from how to 
harness the latest communication technology and with what message, to how best to 
synchronise words and actions. It is a long history that is ignored at the peril of, at best, 
reinventing the wheel or, at worst, committing avoidable mistakes. It is useful to begin 
by outlining a framework of interrelated macro-, mezzo- and micro-level considerations 
for developing effective counter-terrorism strategic communications that are drawn 
from the history of propaganda during conflict (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Macro-, Mezzo- and Micro- Strategic Communications Considerations 
 
Macro-Level Considerations 
 
In the broadest sense, three factors are crucial to maximising the potential impact of 
strategic communication efforts – whether a single message or the broader campaign 
itself. These macro-factors are represented by the 3Rs: reach, which is the ability of a 
message to access target audiences, relevance, referring to the timeliness of the 
message and its significance within the context of immediate situational factors, and 
resonance, which is the message’s influence on audience perceptions typically 
generated by leveraging deeper identity and socio-historical factors. Central to these 
macro-level considerations is a need to identify and understand the audiences that will 
be directly and indirectly targeted by a messaging campaign – friends, foes and 
neutrals. Only with a nuanced understanding of those audiences can proper 
consideration be given to not only how best to reach but what type of messaging is 
likely to be relevant and resonate with them. Indeed, given how messaging tends to be 
disseminated within and across social networks (both on- and offline), a message’s 
reach can be significantly increased if it is deemed relevant and resonates with a target 
audience (e.g. retweets on Twitter). These basic considerations of reach, relevance and 
resonance have been central to messaging campaigns from the Ancients to Da’esh 
because they are fundamental to effective communication.  
 
Mezzo-Level Considerations 
 
Building on those broad macro-level foundations, the next set of considerations relates 
to the specific medium, messenger and format of the message. The medium or means 
of communication needs to be selected based on maximising the reach of the message 
to target audiences. Inevitably, using a single medium, even if it is the latest technology, 
will be inefficient for maximising a message’s reach. For example, Protestant reformers 
in the 16th century may have used the latest printing press technology to reach 
increasingly larger and more geographically disparate audiences but oration remained 
crucial to spreading their message due to widespread illiteracy. 2  Similarly, an 
overemphasis on using the latest social media tools (e.g. Twitter) not only ignores target 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
audience members who may not be regular social media users but is reliant on that 
target network sharing the message amongst peers. Ideally, multiple mediums need to 
be deployed that are selected on the basis of not only the target audience they are 
designed to reach but how those various communication mediums compensate for the 
respective limitations of any one medium in isolation.  
 
Distinct from the functional medium of communication, the messenger selected for 
delivering the message is a crucial mezzo-level consideration. Whether a message will 
be attributed (i.e. author truthfully identified) or unattributed (i.e. author unidentified 
or false) is the first consideration and the larger research paper showed how both types 
of messaging are crucial in a modern communications campaign.3 During the World 
Wars and the Cold War, Western powers disseminated both attributed and 
unattributed messaging – often synchronised with broader messaging efforts and 
actions in the field – to great effect.4 Regardless, the relevance and resonance of a 
message will rely heavily upon whether the messenger of that message is deemed a 
credible source by the target audience. The War on Terror offers countless examples 
of how a misalignment of message and messenger undercut the efficacy of a 
messaging effort. For example, Bin Laden represented a powerful messenger for Al-
Qaeda’s message to sympathisers thanks to his carefully managed image of piety and 
humility. In contrast, officials from secular western governments engaging in counter-
proselytising rhetoric about what is and is not ‘true’ Islam are both very unlikely to 
resonate with Muslims and renders such messaging vulnerable to effective counter-
messaging.5  
 
The format used to present a message is a vital consideration for maximising its effect 
on target audiences. Messaging can be delivered using an enormous variety of formats 
from spoken, sung and written word to still and moving imagery. Included in 
considerations of format is whether the message is formally or informally 
communicated; a decision that will ultimately reflect other macro and mezzo factors. 
The American Revolutionaries used a diverse array of formats in their information war 
against the British from poetry and ballads to leaflets, cartoons and speeches.6 In the 
21st century, groups like Al-Qaeda and Da’esh have used carefully produced videos, 
online magazines, speeches and nasheeds (hymns) in an effort to appeal to their 
constituents.  
 
Micro-Level Considerations 
 
Finally, a range of micro-level considerations need to be factored into the design of the 
message itself. While these factors are also important for the broader strategic 
communications campaign, the following four points are examined from the 
perspective of message design. 
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Rational- and Identity-Choice Messaging 
 
Messaging should always be designed and deployed to have a particular effect on a 
target audience. Inevitably, the desired effect of a messaging campaign will be to shape 
audience perceptions or behaviour. This is broadly achieved with messaging that is 
calibrated to appeal to the audience’s rational-choice (based on a cost-benefit 
consideration of options) and/or identity-choice (based on considerations of one’s 
identity) decision-making processes. Ideally, a variety of messaging will be deployed as 
part of a strategic communications campaign that makes both rational- and identity-
choice appeals. This both increases the potential for the messaging campaign to appeal 
to the broadest spectrum of motivational drivers in the target audience and, if 
synchronised effectively, align rational- and identity-choice decision-making processes 
amongst audience members. Messaging campaigns that have successfully mobilised 
supporters to engage in action almost inevitably deploy both rational- and identity-
choice messaging. Even during the Crusades, when one may expect identity-choice 
messaging to have had a monopoly, rational-choice appeals – such as promises of debt 
relief and collection of war loot – played a significant role in appealing to and mobilising 
supporters. Similarly, Da’esh fuses both rational- and identity-choice messaging across 
its propaganda campaign which may align rational- and identity-choice decision-
making processes in its supporters helping to explain, at least in part, the seemingly 
rapid radicalisation of its supporters from ordinary citizens to active militants. 
 
Defensive and Offensive Messaging 
 
Many governments around the world are focussed on the issue of how to develop 
effective counter-narratives against the extremist propaganda of groups like Al-Qaeda 
and Da’esh. However, it is important to recognise that counter-narratives are an 
inherently defensive type of messaging, i.e. it is messaging designed and deployed in 
response to an adversary’s messaging. In addition to defensive messaging, offensive 
messages designed to deliver your message objectives, control the ‘narrative’ 
competition and, hopefully, elicit defensive counter-messaging from adversaries 
should be an essential component of a counter-terrorism strategic communications 
campaign. During World War II, it was Allied deployment of offensive messaging, 
synchronised with politico-military actions, that proved crucial to turning the 
momentum of the ‘information war’ in its favour and away from the Nazis.7 Indeed, the 
ratio of defensive versus offensive messaging – with a prioritisation upon the latter – 
may represent a useful metric for gauging the dominance of one side over the other in 
the information theatre.  
 
Say-Do Gap 
 
A common trend in the history of propaganda during conflict is the deployment of 
messaging that is designed to highlight the disparity between an adversary’s words and 
actions. A corollary to this type of messaging is communiques that highlight how one’s 
actions match one’s words. Minimising one’s own say-do gap while exacerbating that 
of adversaries is a strategy designed to directly address the issue of comparative 
credibility. This is of more than merely symbolic significance. In lethally uncertain 
environments, such as during war, the actor who is deemed most credible is likely to 
be more trusted and imbue their audience with a greater sense of certainty. This may 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
contribute to a significant advantage in the competition for popular support. Indeed, 
throughout the so-called War on Terror, it was often the West’s perceived say-do gap – 
whether the use of torture in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, the trumped up case 
for the war in Iraq or ‘redlines’ in Syria not backed up by military action – that was 
leveraged in propaganda by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In contrast, Ronald Reagan’s 
National Security Decision Directive 75 outlined his administration’s strategy for defeating 
the Soviet Union and demonstrated a deep appreciation for the importance of 
synchronising narrative and action as a means to compound desired effects in the 
field.8  
 
First-, Second- and Third-Order Effects 
 
While the potential ‘blowback’ effects (i.e. negative repercussions) of imprudent 
politico-military actions is broadly recognised in the field, misguided messaging can 
have inadvertent second- and third-order effects whose impact can be just as 
devastating for winning ‘hearts and minds’. A Brief History of Propaganda during Conflict 
was littered with examples of the ‘blowback’ created by ill-advised or short-sighted 
messaging. For example, during World War I, British atrocity propaganda played a 
significant role in recruitment efforts and winning the support of neutrals. However, 
when it became clear after the war that British messaging had regularly perpetuated 
lies, it had enormous repercussions for not only how future strategic communications 
efforts would be designed but imbued the activity itself with negative connotations that 
persist to this day. For example, during World War II there was both an initial hesitancy 
to report and a scepticism to believe stories of Nazi atrocities. In the 21st century, the 
propaganda of militant Islamist groups is often designed to elicit ill-conceived counter-
narratives from their adversaries – a type of ‘baiting’ strategy – that is then leveraged in 
waves of secondary messaging. 
 
Four Key Strategic-Policy Principles 
 
Drawing on the macro-, mezzo- and micro-level considerations for developing counter-
terrorism strategic communications, the efficacy of a strategic communications 
campaign is more likely to be successful if it is based on the cumulative effects of a 
multidimensional messaging strategy. Four key strategic-policy principles emerge:  
 
1. Produce a diversity of messaging that leverage rational- and identity-choice appeals 
which are deployed both defensively and offensively (with an emphasis on the latter). 
 
Communication campaigns tend to be more successful when they combine a diverse 
array of messaging to cater for what are inevitably audiences characterised by diverse 
motivational and perceptual traits. Put simply, different people will be attracted to 
different messages, hence there is no ‘silver bullet’, making the development of a varied 
combination of messages essential. Campaigns that focus on one message 
automatically restrict their effectiveness by only appealing to particular motivational 
drivers within their target audience. Moreover, combinations of messages, especially if 
carefully synchronised across the campaign, can be mutually reinforcing and amplify 
their effects. The result being that the sum of the campaign is greater than its parts. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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This variety can manifest in several ways but two are particularly important. First, 
messaging should be calibrated to make both rational- and identity-choice appeals to 
target audiences. Second, a strategic communications campaign should include 
defensive and offensive messages. The former is necessary to rebut and neutralise the 
adversaries’ messaging. However, priority should be given to offensive messaging as a 
means to take control of not just the narrative war and the initiative in shaping how the 
conflict is perceived but force one’s adversary onto the defensive.  
 
Overall, effective messages are inevitably credible messages. Without credibility the 
relevance and resonance of communications may evaporate. To do this, messaging 
must always be based on the truth and, crucially, correspond to realities on the ground. 
For example, offensive and defensive messaging that points out the difference between 
what is said and what is done, the so-called ‘say-do-gap’, is a potent messaging tool. 
 
2. All messaging should be cohered by core themes or, ideally, an overarching narrative. 
 
Whilst a plurality of messages is fundamental for a successful communication 
campaign, these messages must be inter-connected and inter-related, building to 
support a coherent and over-arching message. In order to assure this, communiques 
must be based on a set of core themes or ideally a grand narrative (and not the reverse). 
Without this foundation, messages risk appearing ad hoc, rendering the overall 
message at best unclear and confusing, and at worst contradictory. Constructing the 
messages around a grand narrative, creates a set of inter-locking messages that 
reinforce each other, and thus promotes the core message.9  
 
3. Use a variety of mediums for communication to maximise the message’s reach, 
timeliness and targeting. 
 
Whilst the first two principles have focussed on the message itself, the third focusses 
on the means of delivering that message. As well as a variety of messages, a variety of 
mediums of communication should be deployed. Communication campaigns should 
exploit a multitude of appropriate means of communication (e.g. TV, radio, print, social 
media, leaflets and word of mouth) to not only effectively connect the relevant message 
to the right target audience but compensate for the limitations of any single 
communications medium. Moreover, different means of communication may be more 
effective at reaching different audiences. Hence a combination of mediums promises 
both deeper audience penetration and facilitates message repetition and re-
enforcement. It is important, however, to consider the implications of the medium for 
who is targeted, when and how to avoid ‘blowback’ effects. Matching the medium, 
messenger and format to the message and target audience is likely to significantly 
increase its reach, relevance and resonance.  
 
4. To maximise the intended effects of strategic communications efforts and minimise 
inadvertent second and third order effects, messaging should be synchronised with 
strategic-policy/politico-military efforts and seek to nullify the effects of the adversary’s 
activities. 
 
Counter-terrorism strategic communications should not be developed or deployed in 
isolation and must always be integrated with strategic-policy/politico-military actions. 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
  
Modern warfare and in particular irregular conflict consists of two inter-connected 
competitions: the battle for meaning and the battle for control. Whilst the latter is gained 
by politico-military dominance, the former is where messaging campaigns play a crucial 
role in shaping perceptions of the conflict and its actors. Words and actions must be 
understood as two halves of the same coin. To have a coherent and effective strategy, 
requires close integration of these efforts. Ideally, this principle must permeate through 
strategic-policy and doctrinal guidance as well as organisational structures and 
processes. Indeed, if communications and actions are synchronised together 
effectively, then actions themselves very soon become messages: ‘communication by 
action’ (propaganda by the deed). When actions on the ground re-enforce messages, it 
increases the credibility of the message, the messenger and the actor by reducing the 
perceived say-do-gap. This is not only effective offensively but facilitates effective 
defensive messaging by denying the opposition counter-messaging opportunities 
based on highlighting say-do disparities. 
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